

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

INFORMATION OPERATIONS AS AN ELEMENT OF
NATIONAL POWER: A PRACTITIONERS PERSPECTIVE
ON WHY THE UNITED STATES CAN'T GET IT RIGHT

by

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Information Operations As An Element Of National Power: A Practitioners
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Most observers are disturbed to note that the United States of America, the lone super-power and the largest democratic and economically successful country in the history of the world, cannot or will not apply the means required to achieve overwhelming success In Information Operations. In simplest terms, the US is failing to apply a marketing strategy to sell democracy.

How often do senior leaders acknowledge that Information Operations is critical to the success of combating terrorism? Consistently it is stated that "winning the hearts and minds", "winning the war of ideas", or "combating an ideology" is key to victory. If these declarations are true, then why do most senior commanders consistently state "we are losing the Information Operations fight"? The purpose of this paper is to examine the US strategic national policies on Information Operations (IO). Additionally, if the US has a strategic plan in place, is it understood and integral to all operational concepts throughout the force. The author will identify and explain why the US consistently fails to achieve success in implementation of IO and will make recommendations on how to apply this element of national power to achieve the national strategic ends.

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INFORMATION OPERATIONS AS AN ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER: A PRACTITIONERS PERSPECTIVE ON WHY THE UNITED STATES CAN'T GET IT RIGHT

There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run
the sword is always beaten by the mind.

- Napoleon Bonaparte

Information Operations (IO) is a commonly used term, especially over the past several years. Although many definitions can be found, there is a common understanding of the doctrinal definition published in many publications. Most significantly, it is universally accepted that the United States Armed Forces, as well as the government, do not apply this element of national power effectively.

Information Operations is the most ambiguous and misunderstood term used today. It appears that today the term IO is everything except kinetic operations (even though it could include physical attack). Information Operations has something to do with computers, networking, psychological operations, civil affairs, public affairs, media, electronic warfare, deception, physical destruction, and any other activity a commander can't otherwise categorize. In fact, it is probably the most overused term by commanders today. That fact alone is probably a good thing; however, how to use, integrate, and resource for successful information operations, requires much more than just saying "lets use some IO".

How often is it stated by senior leaders that Information Operations is critical to the success of combating terrorism? Consistently it is stated that "winning the hearts and minds", "winning the war of ideas", or "combating an ideology" is key to victory. If these declarations are true, then why do most senior military commanders and government officials consistently state "we are losing the Information Operations fight"? As mentioned above, IO is considered just about everything. In this short paper, the author simply could not adequately address all the IO challenges faced by leaders today. Therefore he will focus on what is considered the operations component of IO as it applies to operations in Iraq. The purpose of this paper is to examine what our strategic national policies are on Information Operations. Additionally, if we have a strategic plan in place, who is directing it and ensuring unity of effort throughout the force. Finally, we'll identify areas that might contribute to our inability to perform effective IO. This paper will attempt to explain why we consistently fail to achieve success in the operations component of IO and will make recommendations on how to apply this instrument of national power to achieve the national strategic ends or at least increase effectiveness.

Most observers are disturbed to note that the United States of America, the lone super-power and the largest democratic and economically successful country in the world today, cannot or will not apply the means required to achieve an overwhelming success. In simplest terms, we are failing to apply a marketing strategy to selling democracy.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Although Information is a tool of national security policy, it is difficult to find who is directing IO or to find clear guidance on how to employ this element of national power.

The current National Security Strategy (NSS) dated September 2002 states: *We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism*. This includes:

- Using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.¹

The National Defense Strategy lists four guidelines for implementing the strategy.

- Create an active defense-in-depth
- Conduct continuous transformation
- Adopt a capabilities-based approach
- Manage risks²

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism dated February 2003 states we must win the “*war of ideas*”, and use the power of our values to shape a free and more prosperous world.³

The 2004 National Military Strategy states the obligatory use all the elements of national power. However it does not address specifically the importance of IO or provide guidance on how to implement IO.

DEFINING INFORMATION OPERATIONS - DOCTRINE

The evolving military information environment will fundamentally change the way the Army conducts operations in peace and conflict. Information Operations (IO) will be integral to all Army operations in the 21st Century. IO include all offensive and defensive measures taken to achieve information dominance and will be integrated into every aspect of the Army

- General Dennis J. Reimer, Former Army Chief of Staff

The development of IO as a major military capability in the United States Government (USG) is a relatively new phenomenon, and much of the critical thinking involved began in the early 1980s. The size of the former Soviet Union's military concerned military analysts and planners. From 1975-1985, the former Soviet Union often outnumbered US conventional forces

by three to one, obviously, there are times when sheer numbers count. During this era, the military strategists of the Pentagon were looking for methods to cut down on the former Soviet Union's advantage by attempting to counter traditional strengths with asymmetric non-nuclear attacks.⁴

Recently, the biggest changes in doctrine are due to the huge technological changes that evolved over the last ten to fifteen years. Advances in computers, software, telecommunications, and networks have revolutionized the way that the USG conducts military operations and have made the US military machine the premier armed force. The magnitude of a series of coalition victories in Operations Desert Storm, Noble Anvil, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom clearly showed to the world the overwhelming technological superiority of the US military.⁵

From the lessons learned from these and other experiences since the end of the Cold War, perhaps the most important result has been the rise in the apparent value of information. It has become clear to war-fighters that the side controlling the most information and retaining the ability to accurately manipulate and conduct an influence campaign was going to be victorious.⁶

Joint Doctrine for Information Operations defines IO as: Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. They apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, and at every level of war. They are a critical factor in the Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) capability to achieve and sustain the level of information superiority required for decisive operations.⁷

Army Field Manual (FM) 100-6 states: Information Operations encompasses all information capabilities, processes, activities, and disciplines that occur within the military information environment and interact with the global information environment. Information Operations is conducted at all levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) and across the full range of military operations (peacetime, conflict, and war). Figure 1 taken from FM 100-6 depicts the military components inside the global informational environment. The three components of IO are: operations, relevant information and Intelligence, and information systems.⁸

In the summer of 2003, the Senate Armed Services Committee questioned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers, on IO during his re-confirmation hearing. Below are some of the opening remarks and questions asked and answers given by General Myers:




FIGURE 1. GLOBAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The opening remarks by the committee chairman stated: Information operations and information warfare will likely have an increasing role in the 21st century warfare. To date, the role of information operations in the contemporary military operations has not been readily apparent.⁹

General, what role do you envision for information operations in future US military operations?

Information operations are maturing rapidly across the Department of Defense (DOD) as a whole and within each individual service. We are committed to fully integrating IO into the JFCs toolkit on a par with Air, Land, Maritime, Space, and Special Operations.

Recent operations have highlighted the importance of each of these core capabilities and IO in Operation Iraqi Freedom was more effective than ever before. And we are addressing the limitations and shortfalls that must be fixed.

What concerns do you have regarding the conduct of extensive information operations?

My primary concern is that the mission area receives required support, both in terms of resources and tailored intelligence. The IO mission is relatively new, when compared to other established military operations. As such, it is in danger of not competing well for scarce resources.

The ability of the US to influence the perception in the Middle East of our intentions has been poor at best. In fact, Colin Powell's 78-minute speech to the UN Security Council broadcast live around the world on 5 February 2003 on its own failed to convince representatives from some of the key nations on the Security Council – France, Germany, and Russia – that military action needed to be taken immediately against Iraq.¹⁰

The Honorable Edward P. Djerejian, Chairman, Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World made the following comment in his testimony to a Senate Subcommittee on Department of Commerce in February 2004:

Today's public diplomacy has proven inadequate to the task. The creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) 50 years ago, at the height of the Cold War, was recognition that traditional state-to-state diplomacy could not achieve U.S. interests in a world of fast communications and sophisticated propaganda. Government is only one player among many trying to influence the opinions of people in other countries, and state-to-state diplomacy will not improve negative attitudes of citizens. Part of this inadequacy is the result of a lack of proper resources, both human and financial, but much of it is the result of insufficient strategic coordination at the top and a management structure that lacks flexibility and limits accountability.¹¹

We have examined some of our strategic guidance on IO, used doctrine to define IO, and reviewed key military and civilian leaders' comments above the critical relevance of IO. So now we need to examine why we consistently fail to achieve success? Shortfalls include: lack of national unity of effort, the warrior culture of US leaders, failure of policy, failure of understanding environmental conditions, and inadequate training and resourcing.

CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY

Greg Jaffe, a journalist with the Wall Street Journal, conducted research and interviews and published an article in December 2004 which concluded the Iraq attack was built on the premise that speed and high-tech equipment could radically change the way war was fought. Short, swift attacks against key targets -- such as communications stations and headquarters -- could confuse enemy forces and isolate them from their commanders, according to both Army and Defense Department doctrine. If you chopped off the enemy's head, the theory went, the whole body would die. Getting to the fight faster became the focus of modernization plans for the Army and all other US armed services.¹²

Now, the escalating insurgency in Iraq is showing that lightning assaults can quickly topple a regime -- but also unleash problems for which small, fast, high-tech US forces are ill-equipped.¹³

"We're realizing strategic victory is about a lot more than annihilating the enemy," says one senior defense official in Mr. Rumsfeld's office. Victory also requires winning the support of locals and tracking down insurgents, who can easily elude advanced surveillance technology and precision strikes. In some cases, a slower, more methodical attack, one that allows US troops to stabilize one area and hold it up as an example of what is possible for the rest of the country, could produce better results, according to emerging Army thinking.¹⁴

An annual war-game, conducted at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA., and is intended to test the Army's fighting strategies. During the week-long exercise, which involves about 600 officers, consultants and defense-department civilians, the US force makes a mock attack against an adversary modeled on an actual country. Military and regional experts judge U.S. and enemy moves with the aid of sophisticated computer programs.¹⁵ The enemy commanders in the game adopted a strategy similar to what is actually happening in Iraq. They rapidly decentralized and were assigned unit areas and directed to operate on their own. US forces continued to attack as if the enemy leaders were trying to control their forces from a central point. The U.S. attacks had little impact by destroying headquarters that were not controlling anything.¹⁶

Jo-Ann Hart, a professor at Brown University and Middle East scholar in a lecture with students during the exercises said the following: "I had soldiers stand up and shout at me and storm out of the room when I suggested that local citizens hostile to the regime would be driven by nationalism to resist a US invasion." She went on to comment, "The military has such a strong belief in the purity of its purposes, it has a hard time understanding why others wouldn't take the same view." The game ended with US forces scattered piecemeal throughout the country, controlling only the small bases on which they sat.¹⁷

The significance of this war-game is evidence that current military commanders, as well as the future senior leaders being trained at the Army War College, revert to their cultural training of applying hard power to accomplish all tasks. Had IO been applied on equal terms as lethal actions and integrated into the overall military effort to shape the environment and most importantly possible know when the main effort should be shifted to soft power, perhaps things would have ended much differently.

Where does the IO function fall in a commander's staff? Most often, it would be agreed that it falls under the J3 (operations.) That construct would be appropriate because IO is, in fact, operations. More often than not however, IO is relegated to just another staff function under J3 and does not get the appropriate visibility required to maximize effectiveness. Until the J3 understands that the power of IO should be planned and executed with the same emphasis

as kinetic operations, it will be a side show. Even more importantly, the JFC, with his J3, must identify the point when the force should transition the main effort from hard to soft power. Who is the IO officer for the force? The obvious answer would be the FA30 officer on the staff, or more reflective with reality, is the designated untrained officer performing this vital function. Logically it should be the commander. Employing combined arms or all battlefield operating systems to accomplish a stated mission is our current doctrine. Information Operations is an important part of the battlefield operating systems.

The strategic policies for IO are not nested across all agencies and departments of government. It is difficult to determine who is responsible and accountable to ensure a unified effort is employed. Nevertheless, a strategic message that is focused and delivered must be able to be received by the targeted audience and then measured for effectiveness.

LACK OF NATIONAL UNITY OF EFFORT

The NSS barely touches or addresses the information arm of national power. Searching for other national policies or guidance reveals little more than addressing the need to employ information. Who is in charge of IO? Is it the State Department? The DOD? United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)? , United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)? Office of Global Communications ?, even the Field Artillery Center at Fort Sill, OK has been mentioned as a new major player in IO.

Until now, the lack of common understanding among the services, combatant commands, and defense agencies impeded improving IO capabilities. The construct promulgated in the 1996 DOD directive on information operations and the 1998 Joint Publication 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, proved too broad for implementation. The depiction was no more than a basket of 13 highly disparate activity areas linked only by their general relevance to militarily useful information.¹⁸

Although probably not well known or understood yet, on October 30, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld signed the *Information Operations Roadmap*, a detailed plan being implemented by the Pentagon.¹⁹ The roadmap charts a course for developing IO into a mature warfighting capability and a core joint competency. It is designed to enable capabilities to keep pace with threats and to exploit opportunities afforded by innovation and information technologies.²⁰

The roadmap strongly supports assigning advocacy and oversight to a four-star combatant commander. One of the advisors to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted during the roadmap development, if the DOD truly cared about IO it would put somebody in charge of it. The advice was accepted and the Commander, USSTRATCOM, was assigned the

responsibility. In the most recent unified command plan, commander, USSTRATCOM was charged with integrating and coordinating DOD information operations across the five core capabilities and across geographic areas. With this mandate, the Commander, USSTRATCOM has specific authority to develop concepts for integrated IO, prioritize information planning needs among combatant commanders, improve measure of information effectiveness, and promote IO in joint concept development. ²¹

The impact of these recent developments, to include USSTRATCOM's addition of the three-star headquarters has not been fully realized. Although, the roadmap is certainly a step in the right direction, commanders at all levels must understand how to implement IO and that it is a part of all operations for planning, resourcing, and execution.

THE WARRIOR CULTURE & TRAINING

The warrior culture taught, fostered and encouraged throughout a soldier's career contributes to the difficulty in applying soft power at the right place and time. Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) train together constantly and learn to apply combined arms effects to maximize destruction on the enemy force. This is not a bad thing; however, it contributes to the inability to appropriately understand and apply the correct ways and means to achieve higher ends. The Combat Training Centers (CTCs) have come a long way in recent years to encourage leaders to apply soft power to influence populations and win the hearts and minds of local civilians on and around the battlespace. However, the short duration of the exercises and minimal training on how to use and synchronize IO results in limited return on investment of time, energy, and efforts. Thus, in the end, the measure of effectiveness is on how well the combined arms team destroyed the enemy utilizing hard power.

Over the life span of our premier CTCs, we have trained leaders that are now our senior Army leaders who have mastered the ability to synchronize hard power to defeat enemy formations. The senior leaders of today have learned to talk about IO and know they "want some", but appear to not fully understand, recognize, or most significantly, be willing to invest the amount of time and resources required to achieve success.

The younger leaders today are rewarded for their ability to maximize weapon systems at the right place and time to achieve decisive victory. Again, the ability to synchronize lethal weapon systems at the right place and time to achieve decisive victory is not easy and must remain a centerpiece of our training programs. However, we must do better at emphasizing and including the combat multiplier of soft power and challenge leaders to know when and how to

apply it. Phase IV (Post Hostilities) activities in Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrate shortfalls in IO planning, resourcing, and implementation.

IRAQ POLICY FAILURES

Operation Iraqi Freedom is such a defining event that it is relevant to discuss the early failures that set conditions for the difficulties faced today. In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the need to apply soft power in the wake of the insurgency is at an all time premium. Given the rapid defeat of the Iraqi army, some through destruction and a significant portion through laying their weapons down and blending in with the populace, winning the support of the Iraqi people rapidly became paramount.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) quickly established control and made policies that directly affected the inability to gain the trust and confidence of the Iraqi people. The de-Bathification policy which prohibited selected military officers, all senior level educators, and all local governmental officials from any employment, had enormous impact on local commanders. This policy, which was opposed by many military commanders on the ground, complicated or prevented the establishment of security and essential services. The displaced and disenfranchised individuals prevented from any employment wielded significant authority and influence in their local provinces. This influence rapidly turned against coalition forces through attacks and adversary information operations. To further exacerbate the problems of US policy failures, coalition commanders had almost no way to influence the information gained by citizens. Handbills produced to pictorially depict a message were ineffective when faced with the flood of propaganda from Al Jazeera and other Arab satellite TV, newspapers, and even CD's.

Another key area that required exploitation within the Iraqi population was the effort being made to increase jobs and essential services. It was difficult for the local population to understand how the great power that so rapidly defeated their government could not quickly provide prosperity to all those who needed assistance in basic essential services and employment. Mission analysis should have provided the strategic direction required to maximize resources to areas that needed them most and not to areas that were the easiest. Al Anbar province (shown in Figure 2) is a good example. Resources were provided primarily to Northern and Southern Iraq, and parts of Baghdad which reached the preponderance of the population. However, the analysis to focus on this area was based purely on population and not on potential future security concerns. The enormous unemployment rate, partly because of previous poor US policies, left no alternative to those civilians who required a means of support to feed families, to sell their services to somebody willing to provide payment.

planning routine operations not related to combat as well as in a variety of operations including NEO, SOF assistance to nations, humanitarian, disaster relief, and many others. In addition, the task of supporting other national objectives also brings the United States into information operations all over the world. It is therefore crucial that these CC planners integrate all operations not only with the respective services, but with other executive departments as well.²³

The IO cell at the Corps level is typically an ad hoc section that might have one Functional Area 30 (FA30) Information Operations trained officer. The Corps will identify key functional staff sections to participate as part of the IO cell. Division organizations might or might not have a trained FA30 IO officer. The division will normally assign a senior staff officer the duties as IO officer, and like the Corps, will assign key staff members by functional area to participate as part of the division IO cell. Below the division level there are usually no school trained IO personnel. At the brigade level and below, personnel are just assigned to perform the function of IO. In most all cases, IO personnel are experts in other areas – detailed for IO with no formal IO experience or training.

Whatever the IO cell actually ends up being, it must be prepared to perform. This preparation includes understanding the culture of the adversary and the environment. Then identifying the vulnerabilities, develop IO objectives and form a strategy to achieve the desired effects.

ENVIRONMENTAL UNDERSTANDING

Once information is determined to be delivered to a designated target, a method of delivery and desired effects must be determined. Although the desired effect might be the same as that for the theater, the method of delivery might be substantially different based on regional environmental differences. Using Iraq as an example; the infrastructure, media outlets, security level, literacy rate, cultural diversity, and tribal beliefs differed significantly by region. Yet, consistently, messages and themes remained the same throughout the theater. Remarkably, so did the expectation on delivering the information to the population. However, the ability- based on resources and infrastructure- to deliver the information to targets varied significantly by units in these different regions.

The question must be asked, does the audience/target have the ability to receive and understand the information?

Considerations based on environment:

- Population – Total population to be affected.

- Ethnic makeup – Religious considerations? Multiple ethnic makeups? Do they need to be treated or addressed differently?
- Tribal Affiliation – Are there key players that can assist in delivering information? Are tribal conflicts in the area that can effect information?
- Infrastructure – Is mass media available? Is electricity/power available? Are local newspapers available and can they be used? Are local television stations operational? Are national media outlets available? Can they be used or even viewed in your region?
- Literacy rate – What is the literacy rate by percentage of population? Break down by internal region.

If a good Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is conducted, then the different target sets and required delivery tools should be evident. Using the doctrinal targeting methodology you would then resource and apply the system to the target to achieve desired effects. Regardless of whether the target type is the same, the delivery systems will most likely change based on the different environmental aspects.

Using Iraq as an example:




FIGURE 3. MAP OF IRAQ'S ETHNIC DEMOGRAPHICS

It is common knowledge that Iraq has three major ethnic groups. In the North there is a predominately Kurdish population. In the South, to include most of Baghdad, the population is predominately Shia, and in the West and some parts south and north of Baghdad, the population is predominantly Sunni. It is also true that the majority of Iraq's infrastructure runs

along the Tigris River from the south up through Baghdad to the north. Given this basic understanding of the environment, a planner can assume the following:

- There are three major distinct ethnic groups to address differently
- The infrastructure to support information predominately is south to north along the Tigris River

Further sub-divisions would be appropriate in the major regions to account for tribal affiliations. In these regions a detailed environmental study would need to account for the considerations mentioned above.

The formalized IO cell at the JFC level integrates IO into the plan and provides a good power point brief showing how numerous systems, themes and messages, will be delivered to achieve the JFC's desired effect.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Information Operations is the most under appreciated and misunderstood instrument of power by our national and military leaders. Based on reading national policies, it is not surprising that we have no clear focus and common direction for government agencies and the military to follow. Commanders know they "want some IO" but are unwilling to make the commitments to set the conditions for success.

The US Army combat arms officers continue to demonstrate their high level of competence applying and synchronizing hard power. When the need arises, any commander will force tailor and task organize to weight the main effort with additional forces to provide the decisive edge for victory. However, when the need exists to task organize appropriate forces for applying soft power, significant resistance is present to use combat forces to augment the effort. It is fairly clear that the insurgency in Iraq requires equal application of hard and soft power to provide security and to inform/influence the local population about the intentions of the occupying force. Coalition forces need desperately to be able to communicate with the local population and to counter enemy propaganda which is very abundant and effective. This environment is where you must know yourself and know the enemy. Target area surveys across the spectrum will show that different ways and means will be required to effectively attack different targets. These surveys should make it apparent that regions, tribes, infrastructure, literacy rates, and customs vary significantly. These variables require different ways and means to achieve the desired ends, even inside the same theater (or country.)

Commanders on the ground appear to demonstrate the desire to apply IO. The knowledge (ways) comes up short and the resources (means) are clearly not made available

and continue to be under resourced for an effective IO effort. Is it possible that the main effort should be IO, supported by combat operations?

Information Operations must be employed from the strategic level to the tactical level in a synchronized manner using military means and public diplomacy. It is not enough to develop an IO plan at the combatant command level or Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) level and expect that the plan will be implemented. It must be very clear to subordinate commanders on what is expected of them. They then must be resourced or directed to apply all necessary resources to accomplish the mission. Commanders must understand that they are the IO officer and that IO is like any other operation to resource – resources and intellectual energy must be applied.

Training and resourcing are keys to the application of soft power. It is clear now what the impact of a few troopers can have on the strategic plan in Iraq. Platoon leaders at all levels can have a strategic impact during daily operations depending on how they execute their duties. How they treat local populations will directly impact on whether these people will support friendly forces or side with the insurgents. The insurgent forces and coalition forces are both trying to sell an idea.

Schools that our leaders attend (officer and NCO) must provide more time and resources to training on how to interact with civilians and what the impact will be if they fail to treat people with dignity and respect. Training on how to kill the enemy in combat is working well. We must also train leaders on the application of selling and promoting our values, beliefs and ideas. In the short term, we must implement a train-up program for our junior leaders that instills and fully tests their ability to employ soft power on an equal basis as hard power.

Senior leaders in the Army must understand the sacrifices to be made to enable soft power to effectively defeat an enemy. They must be willing to use combat forces to augment, or as required, be the primary force to implement soft power. Resources must be provided on the same level as combat equipment – or at least a much higher level than is currently being observed. Providing these resources could be very costly. Such equipment likely would be radio and broadcasting equipment, large and small printing presses, satellite TV, TV's, VCR's, DVD's, computers with internet service, and educational products. The costs likely would be small in comparison to other large expenditures, but the payoff could possibly be measured in fewer casualties and long term dollar savings resulting in more quickly achieving the strategic endstate.

If we put together a strategic plan that rivals the marketing campaigns of selling a leading national beer, we would succeed. In a typical marketing campaign to sell beer one would employ a full-spectrum strategy. As a more recent effective marketing strategy, the presidential

election campaign was a master piece from both major parties in getting their message out and influencing the population. Local and national TV commercials, billboards, and sponsorship programs overwhelmed the population. A detailed market analysis was developed, and then targeted regionally/demographically with the appropriate means to achieve desired results (ends).

Lieutenant General Wallace, who led Army forces during the attack on Baghdad and now oversees the Army's officer-education system, is examining the basic skills that officers will need to prevail in future wars. He's adding a new course on the impact of culture on military operations for mid-career officers at the Army's Command and General Staff College. To teach it, he plans on importing cultural anthropologists and marketing experts who sell to foreign audiences.²⁴

CONCLUSION

Information Operations is a key element of national power that is under applied, misunderstood, and under resourced. It is clear that integrating IO into all operations, today even more than before, is necessary to achieve success. Although most of the above recommendations are focused on the military side of information operations, this is a national-political issue that requires clear strategic direction, realistic and effective policy, resourcing and funding. Then it must be translated and nested into operational and tactical plans.

Our nation understands how propaganda can be a force of good: witness our political campaigns or advertising in general. Similar resources exist in the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and throughout government activities with international reach. The Department of Defense has a piece to contribute. The example of the Office of Strategic Influence was a brilliant idea but poorly marketed.²⁵

However, long it takes to debate the role of an intelligence czar, there is greater need for oversight of the strategic communications community to ensure appropriate and effective messages are transmitted. It makes little difference if it's called public diplomacy, strategic communications, or even strategic influence. Failure to reach the hearts and minds of those who could-just as easily turn against us as support us holds disastrous implications, especially when we have forces deployed in harms way.²⁶

An opportunity was missed when the fall of Baghdad led to the lifting of the ban on satellite receivers for the civilian population. Everyone who could afford the costs of a receiver purchased a dish and black box enabling them to receive hundreds of stations, including several hostile to us but respectable in the region – Al Jazeera and Al Arabia.

At the same time, we took over the nation's TV broadcasting system. It was a land-based terrestrial system and broadcast only to rabbit ears. The US didn't start satellite broadcasting until January 2004. What this lack of understanding and commitment means is that for the first nine months after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the US essentially forfeited the contest for hearts and minds to the competition.²⁷

The United States must win the IO war against terrorism. Much has been learned over the past several years. The limited resources traditionally available to deliver IO and to measure the effectiveness have simply been inadequate. Employing effective IO will require all available resources – personnel and equipment including specialized, combat, combat support, combat service support forces. Commanders must step up to the plate and take ownership. Applying IO to influence the desired targeted population to achieve effective results will require not only a new way of thinking, and training for our commanders, but also, and even more importantly, a new way of training young leaders and a new way of fighting.

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ENDNOTES

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² Donald H. Rumsfeld, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense; 30 September 2001), 2.

³ George W. Bush, *A U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2003), 11.

⁴ Leigh Armistead, *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power*, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2004)

⁵ Ibid., 21.

⁶ Ibid., 22

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*. Joint Pub 3-13. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1998), vii.

⁸ Ibid,1-2.

⁹ U.S. Senate, "Armed Services Committee Confirmation Hearings for General Myers," 24 July 2003; available from <<http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/senate/myers-07-24-03.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2005.

¹⁰ Steven Collins, "Mind Games," *NATO Review*, 2003; available from <<http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/iraq/mind-games.htm>>; Internet; accessed 21 January 2005.

¹¹ Edward P. DeJerejian, "Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee of the Department of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies." 4 February 2004.

¹² Greg Jaffe, "Defining Victory: as Chaos Mounts in Iraq, US Army Rethinks its Future," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 December 2004; available from <<http://rempost.blogspot.com/2004/12/defining-victory-as-chaos-mounts-in.html>>; Internet; accessed 15 December 2004.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Christopher J. Lamb, "Information Operations as a Core Competency," *Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)*, no. 36 (December 2004): 90.

¹⁹ Ibid., 89.

²⁰ Ibid., 89.

²¹ Ibid., 92.

²² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, Joint Pub 3-13 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1998), IV-2.

²³ Armistead, 37.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Charles A. Krohn, "The Role of Propaganda in Fighting Terrorism," *Army Magazine* 54 (December 2004): 7.

²⁶ Ibid., 8.

²⁷ Ibid.

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